On Sep 4, 1941, a British patrol plane took off from its base at Kaldaðarnes, Iceland, on a routine reconnaissance flight that was to lead to a dramatic encounter between the U.S. destroyer Greer and a German submarine , marking the first exchange of shots between the United States and Germany in World War II.  the plane was Hudson aircraft “M” of the 269th Squadron, and was being flown that morning by Warrant Officer A. P. Reen and Pilot Officer Roland Wade.  It was a clear morning, with little wind, a smooth sea, and excellent visibility.  Nearing a position known as Torpedo Junction, 175 miles away, the U. S. Destroyer Greer, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Laurence H. Frost, was making 17.5 knots towards her Iceland destination.  Nearby, German Lieutenant Commander, Georg-Werner Fraatz, took advantage of the smooth sea in the early morning hours to bring the U-652 to the surface for a test trim.  The British, American, and the German were destined to meet by the end of this crucial day, and President Roosevelt was to give a speech on the encounter within a week.

Lieutenant Commander Fraatz had ordered both forward and aft torpedo tubes loaded aboard theU-652, and she was stopped and lying to when the diving klaxon suddenly blared out its warning at 0709 hours.  A land based plane had been sighted high but nearby.  Officers Reen and Wade were surprised to find a surfaced U-boat, and had hoped to get over their target before being seen.  This was not possible, however, for the U-652 crash dived and all that was left was a swirl.  The plane, M/269, dropped a sea marker, and while they were circling the spot, the British Officers sighted the Greer 10 miles away.  Visual communications were established by Aldis lamp, and the plane reported that a German submarine had submerged just ahead.  The Greer went to 20 knots; the men were sent to General Quarters, and the old reactivated World War I destroyer began a zigzag course towards the sea marker. 

The Greer was on a scheduled mail run from Argentia, Newfoundland, to Iceland with supplies for U. S. troops stationed there.  As a captain of a U. S. destroyer in this particular area, Lieutenant Commander Frost realized the difficult position he was placed in as a neutral in a war situation.  His orders were to trail any naval vessels of belligerent powers that entered into the U. S. declared 300 mile neutrality zone.  He was also to broadcast their position on an emergency wavelength to any ships which might be in the area.

Tension mounted aboard the destroyer as she moved in on her German enemy.  Radioman Dent Hess Shields reported underwater sound contact at 0920 hours at a range of 2100 yards.  As the U-652 changed her course, Shields reported the movement, and the Greer followed, always keeping the submarine dead ahead.  This was the first time an American naval crew had actively pursued a German submarine.  The harassment might eventually force the U-boat to the surface, in which case the British could finish the kill.  The patrol plane though was getting low on fuel and soon would be forced to return to base.  The pilot flashed out a question to Frost, asking if the U. S. destroyer would attack?  He replied in the negative as it would have violated his orders to trail but not to attack belligerent ships.  Reen and Wade reported this situation back to their base and asked that a British destroyer be dispatched to the scene in order to complete the action.  This was especially desired, since the Greer continued to maintain an excellent underwater sound contact with the submarine.  Before returning to base at 1030 hours, M/269 flew over the U-boat’s estimated position, dropping four 250lb. depth charges but with no results.  With this, Reen and Wade headed home to their base, discouraged with the fact that although they had come close, they had not been able to make a definite strike.

The U-652 stayed submerged after sighting the patrol plane at 0709 hours, for Fraatz knew his crew was tired from the night, and, moreover, he did not want to be surprised another time.  At 1030 hours, he decided to take a look through the periscope.  Suddenly, as he was coming up, several bombs exploded nearby.  They sounded to him very much like airplane bombs, but he was uncertain.  He was worried that he might possibly have an oil wake and wanted to get away from whatever was up there immediately.  He was stunned to see, without ever having heard it on his sound gear, a four stack destroyer apparently stopped 1200 meters astern.  She was recognised as the same type that had been seen in a convoy on Aug 25/26, and was identical to the fifty American destroyers being handed over to Britain.  Unknown to Fraatz, she was of course the USS Greer.  The only evidence Fraatz had was that he had apparently been depth charged by this destroyer whose exact nationality he could not determine.  How had this ship made such a ghost-like approach?  He wondered about this as he ordered the U-652 to dive and take up a new course.

R. A. F. Flying Officer H. H. Eccles and his co-pilot Joseph G. Owen-King, took off from Kaldaðarnes aboard their Hudson K/269, to relieve Officers Reen and Wade.  Eccles was well briefed before take-off, and knew that a U. S. Navy destroyer was in the tactical area, and that a Royal Navy destroyer, HMS Watchman, was on her way but would not arrive on the scene until early afternoon.  Eccles and Owen-King made contact with the Greer at 1200 hours, and learned that she had an excellent sonar contact at 1000 yards.  They took up statiomn flying figures-of-eight over the destroyer, hoping that eventually the submarine would be forced to the surface.  Eccles waited for he saw no point in dropping depth chargesnuntil he could see something.

At 1220 hours, the periscope of the U-652 once again came up unnoticed, and Fraatz had another look at his hunter.  Since he was receiving nothing on his sound gear, he assumed his pursuer would be at a range equal to what he had covered since his last sighting at 1030 hours, assuming the destroyer had remained stopped.  Instead he was alarmed to see her 1500 meters directly astern.  The four-stacker undoubtedly had him directly on her sonar and was following him at his every move.  His own engines apparently prevented him from picking up anything directly astern of him or his own sound gear.  Even the auxiliary engines aboard the destroyer could not be heard.  Now there was even more to worry about for this time an airplane was flying low over the destroyer.  Fraatz assumed that it was the same one that had caused him to dive earlier that morning.  The plane then, he reasoned, must have ordered this destroyer to his position.  The only way that the ship’s reluctant behavior could be explained to him was that she simply wanted slowly to starve him out until his batteries ran so low he would be forced to surface.

The submerged speed of the U-652 was only 7.6 knots compared to a surface speed of 16 to 17 knots.  The men aboard the U-boat knew that in order to escape they would have to surface, or if they stayed submerged, they would have to confuse the enemy, causing him to lose them on his sonar.  Because of the almost continual daylight so far north at this time of year, attempting to surface unnoticed at such a close range would be impossible.  Fraatz was forced to take action because of his increasingly dangerous predicament’  His orders were not to fire on American or any other ships not first clearly identified.   He noted in his log, however, that he necessarily felt he was being pursued and that he had to defend against further attacks.  It was for these reasons that he ordered the U-652 to turn and attack.  As Fraatz changed course, he noted that he could see the destroyer clearly and that it had no flag, no designation, and caps over the four stacks.

Aboard the Greer Radioman Shields suddenly reported the submarine’s bearing changing to port and then to starboard with range rapidly decreasing.  At 1247 hours, contact was lost at 150 yards.  The surprised destroyer crew actually saw the swirl of the U-boat’s propellers, and then almost immediately lookouts called out the sighting of a torpedo impulse bubble 25 yards directly abeam of the bridge to starboard.  The Greer was being attacked, and Frost ordered 25 knots and a full left rudder.  As the destroyer turned, the track of a torpedo was seen off the port quarter.  At this time, the destroyer actually passed directly over the U-652.  The Greer was ordered to attack and with a full right rudder she changed course 180° dropping eight depth charges at 1256 hours.  It had been nearly 31/2 hours of keyed-up tension since the time she had first picked up the submarine on her sonar earlier that morning.  Next, a torpedo was sighted , passing well clear to port.  Although these were the first exchange of shots between the U. S. and German armed forces, they were not to be the last ones of the day.

Fraatz had been off his computed course of attack at the time he fired his torpedoes.  The destroyer, he correctly reasoned, had increased speed earlier, a fact which he had not detected through his periscope for he had used it only briefly because of the close range of the ship.  As they successfully escaped northward at combat speed, the U-boat crew could hear the depth charges as they were dropped.  The Germans had eluded their harasser, and except for the electric lights kn the diesel engine room, all was working properly.

The Greer immediately recommenced a search of the area.  Eccles and Owen-King continued to circle overhead, waiting with bomb doors open and the rear machine gun manned.  At 1415 hours, the HMS Watchman appeared in the area, being homed to the spot by the patrol plane.  As soon as she was sighted, the Greer discontinued her search and reset course for Iceland, although at 1433 hours one last sweep of the area was again ordered.  Soon, a second contact was made dead ahead at 900 yards.  This time the Greer put eleven depth charges over the side but with no observed results.  The destroyer again took up course for Iceland, and the British patrol plane returned to base.  HMS Watchman was soon joined by two flying boats, who together continued to search the area.  These Fraatz saw when he once again put up his periscope at 1850 hours.  He was satisfied, though, that he was not being trailed as closely as before, and so took the U-652 down to forty meters, making good his escape at slow speed to save the battery.

Lieutenant Commander Fraatz did not make an immediate report of his encounter to the German Submarine Command.  At the time, he did not realise that he had been dealing with an American, although he presumed that he was.  It was almost exactly twenty-four hours after Fraatz left the area that he learned by way of a news report that President Roosevelt had informed the American press that a German submarine had fired upon the U. S. destroyer Greer.  Fraatz’s assumption had been confirmed, and he realised that he had been in fact dealing with an American destroyer.  Soon he received a radio despatch from the Submarine Command, demanding who had fired torpedoes at the Greer.  At 1821 hours on Sep 5th he made his reply.  the nationality of the destroyer, Fraatz explained, he had not been able to identify.  his attack had come only after long harassment, he radioed, and his shots had been intended only as a defensive maneuver.

President Roosevelt did not take the Greer incident lightly.  He seized upon it as an opportunity for a new and strong policy statement both to the American people and to the German armed forces.  In his world-wide “rattle snake” speech of Sep 11, 1941 he made it dynamically clear that the U. S. would not again be intimidated by the actions of Nazi aggressors.  The U. S. would in effect shoot first, and would begin convoying any and all ships to and from Iceland.  This led directly to the arming of U. S. merchant vessels.  For the pilot of a British patrol plane, a captain of a German submarine, and a captain of a U. S. destroyer, their brief encounter with one another had not seemed of such importance nor of such far reaching consequences.  On Sep 4, 1941, an oddity of war brought the three together, for somewhere on some front the United States was to meet Germany in their first exchange of shots in World War II.

Footnote

Reaction of American and German Governments to the Greer Incident

American Reaction

 

Above are copies of the US Navy report on the incident and the covering note to the President.  Below is a comment from ‘The Washington Post’ on the subsequent action taken by the President:

 

German Reaction

On 12 September 1941 the German Naval Staff sent a memorandum to the German Foreign Office referring to a telephone conversation between Minister Eisenlohr and Count Staffenberg and outlining the details of the attack based on a message from the U652.  She was “attacked with three depth charges and further harassed by a destroyer, flag unrecognised, at 1230 [German Summer Time] on September 4 at 62° 31¢ N, 27° 06¢ W.  At 1439 the submarine fired a spread of two in defence, which missed and was observed.  She was further pursued with depth charges until 2330.  The submarine suffered no damage.  The weather was good.  So far, no further messages have been received.”

On 16 September 1941 Admiral Raeder received the following telegram from Washington:

“After Senator Connally and Pepper, who are supporters of the administration, had already tried in press interviews – evidently on instructions and in order to calm public apprehension – to limit the term “defensive waters”, in which the American Navy can fire, to waters of the Western Hemisphere which are patrolled by the American Navy, Secretary of the Navy, knox, today defined the expression definitely in a talk to the American Legion Convention at Milwaukee: “From September 16 the American Navy will protect ships sailing under all flags carrying lend-lease war material between the American continent and the waters of Iceland ‘as completely as lies in our power’.”

Thus it is evident that the definition of the term in Roosevelt’s speech was deliberately left vague for the present, primarily in order to comply with Churchill’s wishes for active American aid in the war and in order to intimidate us and Japan; it is also evident that the American Navy is not capable of patrolling effectively the entire Atlantoic including the route around Africa to Suez, but it can certainly take over entirely convoy escort between the American continent and Iceland.  Knox’s statement shows clearly that the President is well aware of the lack of operational capacity of American forces beyond this limited sphere because of commitments in the Pacific.”

On September 17 1941 Admiral Raeder reported to Hitler his evaluation of the strategic and political situation created by the speech of the President of the USA and stated “In the future American forces will no longer be employed merely for reconnaissance but also for convoy duty, including escort of British ships.  German forces must expect offensive war measures by these US forces in every case of an encounter.  There is no longer any difference between British and A,merican ships……”.He then gave details of a proposed new operational policy which extended the rules of engagement.  Hitler replied that care should be taken to avoid any incidents in the war on merchant shipping before the middle of October because of the imminence of a ‘great decision in the Russian campaign’.  Admirals Raeder and Doenitz consequently withdrew the proposal, but it was agreed that “Submarines are to be informed of the reason for temporarily keeping to the old orders.”